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Understanding China’s curriculum reform for the 21st century 
 
Wing-Wah Law, The University of Hong Kong 
 
This article uses curriculum making frameworks to analyse and reconstruct the 
Chinese curriculum-making model and unpack the dynamics, complexity, and 
constraints of China’s curriculum reform since the early 1990s. It argues that 
curriculum reform is China’s main human capital development strategy for 
coping with the challenges of the 21st century, and that the state plays an 
important role in the reform of curriculum making mechanisms and in the 
social distribution of knowledge, skills and dispositions through curriculum 
making. Data are drawn from a discourse analysis of public texts, such as 
official documents and curriculum standards. This study has four major 
findings. First, China uses curriculum reform as a key strategy to counter 
manpower-related global challenges and to empower the country in the 21st 
century. Second, to this end, China has re-oriented its curriculum making from 
a state-dominated model to one that is state-led, expert-assisted and evidence-
based. Third, China’s new curriculum reflects the increasing tension between 
globalization and nationalism; while preparing its students to compete globally, 
China also urges them to identify with and take pride in the nation’s 
achievements and culture. Fourth, Chinese curriculum reform for the 21st 
century may not unfold as the state expects, as it is constrained by curricular 
and extra-curricular factors. 
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As China emerges as a world power, it and the international community seek to 
deepen their mutual understanding (Jacques, 2012; Obama, 2009). While there is 
scholarly debate over whether China might dominate the global economy and world 
order in the 21st century (Beckley, 2011; Shenkar, 2005), China’s sustained rise and 
long-term growth largely rely on its human capital development, which depends on its 
education system (W. Chen, 2012; Morgan, 2012). China has recognized this 
challenge since the 1980s (Communist Party of China Central Committee, 1985); 
however, understanding its approach thereto requires understanding the dynamics and 
complexity of Chinese curriculum reform, including how constraints on that reform 
might limit China’s manpower development potential. This topic is, however, under-
researched in English-medium literature. 
Since the late 20th century, globalization has compelled China and other 
countries to reform their educational institutions and curricula (Yates & Young, 2010). 
China approach, conducted in two sequential stages since the 1990s, reformed 
compulsory basic education curriculum for its roughly 150 million primary and junior 
secondary students. The Principal Stage (early-1990s to 2001) laid the major 
foundations for the curriculum reform and led to experimental curriculum standards, 
while the Fine-tuning Stage (2001-2011) refined those standards and gradually 
implemented them nationally.  
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This article unpacks the dynamics and struggles of China’s curriculum reforms 
and the related complex interplay between state and other actors since the 1990s. Its 
theoretical analysis and reconstruction of China’s curriculum making approach is 
guided by Doyle’s (1992a, 1992b) tripartite curriculum framework (institutional, 
programmatic, and classroom curricula), and Haft and Hopmann’s (1990) and 
Westbury’s (2003) frameworks for state-based curriculum making. Specifically, it 
focuses on social perceptions of what schools should do (institutional curriculum) and 
the curriculum standards (programmatic curriculum) promulgated as official 
pedagogical discourse in 2001 and 2011. It examines the state’s mediation between 
society and schools and between China and the world, and how this has 
recontextualized the pedagogical discourse. It does not address classroom curriculum, 
which deserves separate study, but does examine possible constraints on translating 
programmatic curriculum into classrooms.  
The article argues that curriculum reform is China’s primary manpower 
development response to 21st century challenges, specifically economic, socio-
political and educational needs arising from social changes; it is marked by struggles 
regarding the social distribution of knowledge, skills, and dispositions, and between 
preparing students to compete globally and preserving their sense of national identity. 
To rationalize this distribution, China has set the overall direction for institutional 
curriculum reform, but has engaged various players (e.g. experts, principals and 
teachers) to build consensus around its programmatic curriculum. Moreover, since the 
early 1990s, the state has played key roles in institutional and programmatic 
curriculum making, negotiating between global and national frames of reference. This 
negotiation is refracted into and reflected by struggles between curriculum’s 
economic and socio-political tasks. In programmatic curriculum making, the state 
selects global curriculum elements that will equip students to survive and compete 
globally; it also acts as gatekeeper, infusing state-prescribed socialist and Chinese 
values into curricula to foster a socialist citizenry. China’s curriculum reform and 
human capital development, however, is constrained by curricular and extra-curricular 
factors. 
This article first reviews the literature on curriculum making, and then 
presents its methodology. Next, it examines China’s institutional and programmatic 
curricula, reconstructing the nation’s approach to curriculum making and analysing its 
globalization/nationalism dilemma. Third, it discusses challenges to realizing 
institutional and programmatic curricula in classrooms, then concludes by discussing 
the state’s role in curriculum making, the importance of curriculum to cultural 
heritage, and constraints on curriculum reform. 
Curriculum and State-based Curriculum Making 
The 1990s and 2000s witnessed a major shift of focus in curriculum research; rather 
than concentrating on the work of schooling (Westbury, 2007), curriculum 
development and implementation (Connelly & Xu, 2012), and curriculum systems 
and services, researchers increasingly addressed student learning outcomes (Sivesind, 
Van den Akker, & Rosenmund, 2012), comparative accountability, high-stakes 
assessment, academic standards and standard-based reforms (Hopmann, 2008); this 
put curriculum theory in ‘a state of crisis’ (Z. Deng, 2013, p. 653). Despite this, 
research on curriculum making processes and programmes could still explain 
‘knowledge formation and education policy steering’ in Europe (Sivesind et al., 2012, 
p. 320) and countries such as China.  
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Doyle’s (1992b) framework theorizes curriculum making as a series of 
dynamic, complicated processes at the institutional, programmatic, and classroom 
levels. Institutional curriculum is a shared conception of what school should be, 
combining society’s educational aspirations and expectations and schools’ forms and 
procedures (Doyle, 1992a). The framework focuses on the policy intersection between 
schooling, society, and culture (2003, 2008b), embodying social expectations, 
creating a new language of education and using metaphors and narratives concerning 
the purposes and aims of schooling, teaching and learning to steer the discussion 
(Westbury, 2008a) and to rationalize and justify ‘the selection and arrangement of 
content’ for the programmatic curriculum (Doyle, 1992b, p. 487), which translates 
institutional curriculum into school subjects or programmes of study (Doyle, 1992b) 
and outlines intended outcomes (Westbury, 2003). It involves subject formulation, the 
content selection and prioritization and curriculum standards development that meet 
the social expectations and purposes informing the institutional curriculum. 
Classroom curriculum is what teachers/students/communities actually 
implement/enact (Doyle, 1992a) through a sequence of jointly developed classroom 
events (Westbury, 2003). As such, tripartite curriculum making can be seen as the 
process of recontextualizing and reproducing knowledge after its production 
(Bernstein, 1990; Singh, 2002). Institutional and programmatic curricula generate and 
recontextualize pedagogical discourse, respectively (Neves & Morais, 2001). 
Haft and Hopmann’s and Westbury’s state-based curriculum-making 
frameworks help explain the leadership role of China’s national leadership in 
curriculum reform and interactions with stakeholders. Curriculum making is a social 
process that determines and legitimizes what knowledge, skills and dispositions are 
distributed through education and how, with the state as principal regulator. In many 
national education systems, curriculum is a state-based document approved by 
educational authorities, and curriculum administration is symbolic, concealing 
complex power relations and struggles over the distribution of knowledge between 
dominant forces (Haft & Hopmann, 1990), both insiders (e.g., the state, curriculum 
developers, professional associations) and local players (e.g., school boards, parent 
associations, unions) (Kirst & Bird, 1997; Westbury, 2008a). At the institutional 
curriculum level, the state can turn public curriculum-making into ‘a vehicle for 
steering a national dialogue … about the narratives and metaphors of the nation and 
school’ to form and reform ‘the public’s and teachers’ canopy of understandings 
about schooling’ (Westbury, 2008a, pp. 58, 59). Thus, the state defines curriculum by 
generating the pedagogical discourse, legitimizing ‘the principles of distribution of 
social power and control’, and recontextualizing official pedagogical discourse as 
syllabus (Neves & Morais, 2001, p. 454). 
The state (particularly educational authorities) can recontextualize the 
pedagogical discourse for regulating and balancing the interests of diverse social 
groups in the selection of knowledge, skills and dispositions. Haft and Hopmann 
(1990) argued that to ensure this distribution is socially secured and not effectively 
challenged, social definitions must be imposed by consensus or through social 
acceptance. Three administrative instruments of symbolic action safeguard social 
interests: compartmentalization of knowledge into subject-based syllabuses, 
(cataloguing goals and contents and providing guidelines for structuring schooling); 
licensing of teaching (separating state-run curriculum development from school-level 
instruction planning and disengaging public authorities from executive responsibility); 
and segmentation (facilitating the discussion and negotiation of administration 
between practitioners and external forces). These instruments involve dynamic and 
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complicated interactions between school, family, community and 
political/administrative agents, recontextualizing pedagogical discourse (Neves & 
Morais, 2001). Westbury (2008a, p. 55) interpreted these instruments as pacification 
tools – compartmentalization by taming ‘what [one] know[s] or believe[s] cannot be 
attained’, and licensing by shifting responsibility for outcomes onto teachers and 
schools. 
Several works have examined China’s curriculum reformation response to 
globalization. Focusing on education’s economic function, Wang (2012) traced the 
history of Chinese curriculum reforms, identifying changes in reform-promoting 
terminology from 1978-2008. Huang (2004) identified major intended changes and 
introduced in China’s Principal Stage curriculum reform strategies, while Deng (2010) 
examined curriculum making processes and Dello-Iacovo (2009) evaluated China’s 
use of ‘quality education’ to promote curriculum reform.  
These studies, however, do not specifically examine how China has handled 
external globalization pressures and maintained its own cultural traditions. This 
inadequacy is somewhat supplemented by Ding’s (2001) comparison of Chinese 
approaches to foreign influences on its educational institutions in the 1920s-1930s and 
the 1980s-1990s. Focusing on education’s economic function, Ding demonstrated that, 
despite different political leaderships, similar approaches were taken to educational 
reform in both eras – Western elements were integrated with emerging practices to 
balance domestic and external/international influences and develop an ‘education 
system with Chinese characteristics’ to suit national aspirations (p. 182). Liu and Fang 
(2009) contended that China’s adoption and adaptation of Western education and 
curriculum concepts reflected negotiations between global/local dynamics, creating 
‘globalization with Chinese characteristics’ (p. 411). 
Although the literature sheds light on China’s curricular responses to 
globalization, it addresses neither curriculum-making developments in the Fine-tuning 
Stage, nor four major aspects of China’s school curriculum reform since the 1990s: 
the complex interplay between the state and other actors; struggles between the 
curriculum’s economic and socio-political functions; curriculum elements specific to 
China’s culture and achievements added at the Fine-tuning Stage; and, curricular- and 
extra-curricular challenges to China’s curriculum reform and human capital 
development. 
The study: Its Purpose and Research Methodology 
Based on the above, this study investigates the dynamics and complexities of China’s 
curriculum reform in response to globalization and social change since the 1990s. It 
poses three interrelated, major research questions. 
 
1. What were the key reasons used by the Chinese government to reform its 
basic education curriculum beginning in the early 1990s, and how did that 
generate and shape social expectations for the nation and schooling 
(institutional curriculum)? 
2. How did the Chinese government recontextualize and translate such 
expectations into curriculum standards (programmatic curriculum)? 
3. What are the possible challenges to realizing these expectations through 
curriculum reform? 
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This study used critical discourse analysis to reconstruct and interpret why and 
how China reformed its curriculum. Critical discourse analysis can help reconstruct 
the social world of China’s curriculum reform by identifying historical and 
contemporary contexts, tracing events and developments (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002; 
Marshall & Rossman, 2006), understanding conditions and politics underlying 
specific problems/issues and social interactions (van Dijk, 2003), and exploring 
connections between language, power and ideology (Junling Wang, 2010). 
This study analysed two major types of public documents related to the two 
consecutive stages of curriculum reform.  First, official curriculum standards for some 
20 primary and junior secondary education subjects, both the 2001 experimental and 
the 2011 fine-tuned versions; these state-mandated programmes of study are 
‘authoritative statements about the social distribution of the knowledge, attitudes, and 
competences seen as appropriate’ (Westbury, 2008a, p. 47) and are ‘legitimate official 
pedagogical discourse text(s)’ (Neves & Morais, 2001, p. 454). Second, state policy 
documents (such as Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee’s decisions 
on education policy and speeches and/or reports by CPC leaders) and the 1999 and 
2010 national educational development plans, which, in contemporary China, 
effectively constitute institutional curriculum, capture state and societal expectations, 
and indicate how schooling can equip students to meet those expectations. These 
documents are often cited as authoritative sources for educational reform. For 
example, the Ministry of Education (MoE) (2001b) has stated that the 2001 
curriculum reform was launched to implement the CPC Central Committee’s (1999) 
Decision Concerning the Deepening of Education Reform and the Full-scale 
Promotion of Qualities Education.  
Following Wiersma’s (2000) suggestion, the analysis identified, categorised 
and synthesised noteworthy or regularly-used words, phrases and events (e.g., 
economic globalisation, education/curriculum aims or goals, student/teacher 
expectations). Similar to Bryan’s (2012) discourse analysis, the study focused on texts 
related to such analytical questions as: ‘What are the state’s nation building aims in 
the 21st century?’; ‘What are the perceived challenges to human capital development 
of globalization and domestic change?’; and, ‘What are the major changes needed in 
terms of curriculum purposes and tasks, content, teaching and learning activities, and 
assessment?’ 
It should be noted that the adoption of these public official documents as 
major sources for analysis, however, has its own limitations. While they represent the 
official view, they do not necessarily represent the actual viewpoints of other 
curriculum stakeholders, particularly teachers, students, and parents. Likewise, 
although they indicate intended curriculum changes, they do not necessarily reflect 
actual outcomes or classroom teaching and learning realities. In other words, there 
could be gaps between classroom curriculum and institutional and programmatic 
curricula, as well as between intentions and reality in curriculum reform in China, as 
will be shown later. 
China’s approach to state-based curriculum reform 
This section examines why and how the Chinese government revised its school 
curriculum, and how its institutional and programmatic curricula are used to address 
new economic, political and educational needs arising from social change, including 
globalization, since the late 1990s. Specifically, it analyses the Chinese state’s 
aspirations for nation building and expectations regarding schooling (institutional 
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curriculum) for the early 21st century, and how it translated these into a state-
mandated program of study (programmatic curriculum). China’s two sequential 
curriculum reform stages show how its approach to state-based curriculum making at 
the national system level changed from a top-down model to one that engaged 
different curriculum stakeholders in the recontexualization and social redistribution of 
knowledge, skills and dispositions. This approach was marked by three major, 
interrelated phenomena: the state’s initiation and engineering of social perceptions of 
the nation’s future and schooling; an evidence-based approach to curriculum making 
at different junctures; and, diverse players revamping and deciding the programmatic 
curriculum. The latter two reflect state efforts to legitimise the pedagogical discourse 
and reduce challenges to the reform.  
State-guided, social perceptions of China’s future and challenges 
The first feature common to the Principal and Fine-tuning Stages is that both were 
state-initiated, with the state acting as principal regulator of the social distribution of 
knowledge. The stages arose from China’s hopes for rejuvenation and its fears that its 
manpower development trailed that of its global competitors, and were an attempt to 
deal with problems arising from China’s educational expansion. One important state 
means of shaping other players in institutional curriculum making was to steer and 
guide national discussions about the nation and schooling (Westbury, 2008a); the 
Chinese state played an important role in setting the institutional curriculum in both 
reform stages by highlighting common aspirations for nation building and using 
education to achieve those in the 21st century. These aspirations, politically driven and 
shaped by historical and contemporary contexts, reflected the circling of China’s past 
and future around its institutional curriculum making. 
China’s leaders’ aspirations for its global rejuvenation have been an important 
component of its institutional curriculum since 1978, and are closely related to the 
CPC’s desire and need to demonstrate its leadership ability. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping 
expressed his wish that China’s per capita GDP reach the middle level of developed 
countries by the mid-21st century. Deng’s successors, Jiang Zemin (1997) and Hu 
Jintao (2007) established related nation-building goals, including making China a 
fairly prosperous society by 2020 (the 100th anniversary of the CPC), and a strong, 
prosperous, modernized socialist country by the mid-21st century (the 100th 
anniversary of the PRC); in his inaugural speech, Xi Jinping (2013) called realizing 
China’s rejuvenation by the mid-21st century the ‘Chinese dream’. 
These new institutional curriculum aspirations can be interpreted as the 
historical legacy of late-Qing Dynasty military defeats that confronted imperial China 
with its economic and technological backwardness (G. W. Wang, 1977). Reformists 
such as Liang Qichao (1936) criticized China’s traditional, Confucian-oriented culture 
and education for focusing on cultivating an obedient, agrarian citizenry and for 
failing to develop and modernize China. What many Chinese saw as the source of their 
cultural identity seemed “irrelevant or worse” in a world shaped by the Industrial 
Revolution (Gray, 1990, p. 3). To revive the nation and foster a modern citizenry, the 
late-Qing and Republic of China (ROC) governments established Western-style 
public educational systems, and re-purposed Chinese education to affect economic 
modernization by emphasizing language proficiency and science literacy (Ministry of 
Education, Republic of China, 1934). However, they still selectively used Confucian 
values in citizenship education to foster Chinese cultural identity (Law, 2011). 
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This tension between development and preserving national identity in 
schooling expectations persisted in 1950s’ socialist China. In its efforts to establish a 
utopian, socialist China, the CPC-led state, under Mao Zedong, adopted a dualistic 
worldview (communism versus capitalism) in its diplomatic relations, replaced 
Confucianism with socialism as the state orthodoxy for guiding China’s development, 
eliminated market forces and introduced a universal planned economy, suppressed 
civil society, and criticized Chinese culture as feudal and as a barrier to China’s 
modernization (Law, 2011; Tang & Zuo, 1996; Yabuki, 1995). In terms of education, 
Mao emphasized the curriculum’s economic and socio-political function of 
cultivating ‘new socialist’ persons for China’s modernization (T. H.-E. Chen, 1969) – 
students who would be ‘red and expert’ (i.e., possessing a socialist political 
consciousness and academic knowledge or technical skills (Baum, 1964)).  
In the late 1970s, under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the CPC-led state began 
to reverse most of Mao’s policies. Economic development replaced class struggle as a 
Party objective, and a policy of reform and opening China to the world was enacted in 
1978 (Communist Party of China Central Committee, 1978). Internationally, China 
expanded its diplomatic relations, until then mainly limited to other socialist states, to 
include capitalist countries, including its former main ideological enemy, the United 
States. It also increased its competition for global capital, and its integration with and 
engagement in the world economy by, for example, joining, in 2001, the World Trade 
Organization (Chow, 2011). Although maintaining tight control, China began to allow 
foreign countries foreign nationals to enter its economic, educational, and cultural 
markets.  
Domestically, there were significant changes in the relationships between the 
state, market, and society. The CPC-led state successfully used market economic 
forces to revive its socialist economy, even allowing some areas and people to get rich 
ahead of the rest of the country. By 2010, China had become the world’s second 
largest economy (after the United States). In 2011, China’s per capita GDP was 
RMB35,083, more than 90 times its 1978 level of RMB381 (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2012); although this is still low compared to other countries, it nonetheless 
affords Chinese people greater freedom to choose their lifestyles, own property, and 
buy stocks and securities. Moreover, the CPC-led state has changed its policy on civil 
society from suppression to toleration, leading to dramatic growth in non-government 
organizations, mass media and electronic mass media (Yu, 2002). The CPC-led state 
has also accepted the spread of the Internet and Internet-connected smartphones, as 
well as public discussion in the cyberspace on a range of topics, including criticisms 
on the government and its policies; however, it continues to block access to websites 
and discussion topics it deems a potential threat to social stability or its political 
leadership. Accompanying these advancements, however, are serious social problems, 
including increased economic and social disparities between and within areas, the 
intensification of social unrest and ethnic conflicts, and growing popular 
dissatisfaction with governmental performance (Law, 2011). To address some of these 
problems, the CPC-led state, as will be shown later, turned to traditional Chinese 
cultural values, such as “harmony”. 
Despite China’s recent emphasis on its economic growth and global 
prominence, its institutional curriculum has retained its dualistic nature, with 
politically-motivated national revival goals in the contexts of a changing society and a 
changing world.  Deng (1983) recast the ‘red and expert’ formula in a less ideological 
way, gearing education to the needs of modernization, the world and the future (sange 
mianxiang) in order to cultivate ‘new persons with four-haves’ (siyou xinren) – 
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socialist ideals, moral virtue, good education, and discipline. Similar goals were 
enshrined in 1999’s Decision Concerning the Deepening of Education Reform and the 
Full-scale Promotion of Qualities Education and the 2010’s Outline of China’s 
National Plan for Medium- and Long-term Education Reform and Development 
(2010-2020).  
Both documents reveal the state’s rhetoric of justification to other curriculum 
stakeholders (including schools, teachers, students, parents, and the general public) 
for fostering popular sense of urgency regarding perceived external and domestic 
challenges. They emphasize China’s need to address dramatic scientific and 
technological progress, an increasingly globalized economy and intensified 
international competition (Communist Party of China Central Committee & State 
Council, 1999, 2010), and articulate the CPC’s fear that China may lag behind other 
countries. They further justify the need to revise programmatic and classroom 
curricula by identifying domestic problems (from economic development to 
environment protection) confronting China’s reform and development efforts, and by 
criticizing Chinese education for trailing other countries in educational theories, 
systems and structures, training models, curriculum contents and pedagogies, and for 
not helping improve China’s citizenry. 
Another impetus for Chinese institutional curriculum making was the change 
in school clientele arising from the expansion of basic and higher education. In the 
late 19th and mid-20th century United States, expanding secondary and higher 
education to meet increased ‘demand for highly trained and educated people of all 
kinds’ turned primary or secondary education into a preparatory stage for higher 
education rather than an exit to the labour market, leading to major educational and 
curriculum reforms placed ‘the children with their background and needs’ before ‘the 
school with its content and purposes’ (Trow, 1961, p. 154).  
Since the 1986 introduction of nine-year compulsory schooling, the 
universalization of senior secondary education in the early 1990s and the 
massification of higher education in the late 1990s, China’s has faced similar 
pressures for curriculum change. To address expanding student enrolment, 1999’s 
Decision and 2010’s Outline assigned Chinese education the twin tasks of cultivating 
more and better talents to allow China to compete globally, and turning China’s huge 
population into an asset for national development and ‘the revival of Chinese nation’ 
in the 21st century (Communist Party of China Central Committee & State Council, 
2010); the Outline even specifies increasing secondary and higher education 
enrolment rates to 90% and 40%, respectively, by 2020. The change in China’s school 
clientele has shifted the focus of major educational discourse from the provision of 
school places to the quality of school education (Dello-Iacovo, 2009). Addressing the 
latter, the MoE (2001b) expressed China’s determination to reform and modernize its 
curriculum for nine-year compulsory education by shifting from a ‘textbook-centric’ 
to a ‘student-centric’ pedagogical model and reducing the difficulty of learning 
contents. 
To that end, both documents emphasize ‘red and expert’ as a major economic 
and socio-political curriculum making principle. However, while 1999’s Decision 
employs Deng’s 1983 version of ‘red and expert’, 2010’s Outline casts it as 
persistently prioritizing moral education (jianchi deyu weixian) and emphasising 
competences (jianchi nengli weichong). It assigns education the socio-political tasks 
of developing students’ patriotism and ‘firm belief and faith in the [CPC’s] leadership 
and socialist system’ and transmitting the CPC’s political values and socialist model 
(Chapter 2). Regarding economic tasks, it accepts global education imperatives, 
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highlighting competence rather than knowledge. Modelling UNESCO’s (1996) four 
pillars of learning (learning to know, to do, to be, and to live together), it urges 
strengthening students’ competencies by teaching them ‘knowledge and skills... to use 
brain and hands... to survive and live, and... to be and to do’ (Chapter 2). This re-
interpretation of the dual task of education, as demonstrated later, is refracted in and 
reflected by the 2011 school curriculum. 
From McEneaney and Meyer’s (2000) perspective, political aspirations for 
national rejuvenation and critiques of China’s educational quality are, together, 
compelling reasons for China to modernize its education and curriculum. This 
suggests the state made these two documents part of the institutional curriculum to 
express its expectations and to frame a national dialogue on what Chinese schooling 
should be and do for the nation and its students in a global era. As shown below, they 
guide the translation from institutional to programmatic curriculum, and inform the 
latter’s priorities. 
Emphasis on evidence-based approach to inform programmatic curriculum 
making 
Programmatic curriculum making translates ideals and expectations found in the 
institutional curriculum into school subjects or programs (Doyle, 1992b); it is an 
arena in which stakeholders fight over what is to be selected, prioritized and included 
in the curriculum (Hopmann, 1990). Although it steered the national discussion, the 
Chinese state adopted an evidence-based approach to decision making at important 
junctures of this process, to moderate the curriculum reform and enhance the 
legitimacy of its intended outcomes (including curriculum standards) in China’s 
increasingly pluralist society. To that end, the state collected evidence from surveys 
and consultations, and piloted the programmatic curriculum in selected areas, 
highlighting its new approach to curriculum making in the two sequential reform 
stages. 
Pre-1990s curriculum reforms met with ‘little resistance or objection’, because 
they mainly involved educational administrators and textbook editors making ad hoc 
changes to teaching plans and textbooks (Jianjun Wang, 2012, p. 59). The 1986 
introduction of nine-year compulsory basic education meant the curriculum now had 
to meet the learning abilities and needs of all eligible students, not only the elite. 
Comprehensive subject-specific curricula (kecheng) began to replace earlier 
prescriptive ‘teaching plans’ (jiaoan). In the 1990s, with China facing new economic 
and socio-political challenges, parents, teachers and education specialists began 
widely and severely criticizing Chinese education and curricula for not 
accommodating the shift from quantity- to quality-related educational needs and to 
equip students to cope with emerging global economic needs and challenges (Dello-
Iacovo, 2009), concerns similar to the state’s. 
To ease public dissatisfaction with and solicit public support for curriculum 
reform, the MoE began, in the late 1990s, to involve national, local and school-level 
stakeholders in developing curriculum standards for primary and junior secondary 
education (F. Q. Huang, 2004). Between 1993 and 1997 (during the Principal Stage), 
the MoE unprecedentedly surveyed opinion in nine provinces and municipalities to 
inform the 2001 programmatic curriculum, soliciting the opinions of some 16,000 
students, over 6,000 school principals and teachers, and roughly 50 members of the 
Committee of Education, Science and Culture of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (China’s highest political advisory body) (Cui, 2001). The 
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survey provided empirical evidence on major problems confronting the Chinese 
curriculum, including: (a) an over-emphasis on knowledge transmission; (b) having 
too many subjects and too little coherence; (c) difficult, tedious courses that were 
unbalanced (in favour of the sciences) and featured outdated curriculum contents; (d) 
passive, rote learning; (e) an over-reliance on assessment to select students for higher 
education; and (f) a failure to address the diverse needs of China’s huge population 
(MoE 2001b). These findings helped the MoE define what needed to be changed in 
the school curriculum, including pedagogy and assessment and, with expert help, it 
produced draft curriculum standards for 18 primary and junior secondary subjects and 
organized over 100 public seminars to gather feedback; the resulting ‘experimental’ 
curriculum standards (shiyan gao) were promulgated  in June, 2001. 
Programmatic curriculum making in the Fine-tuning Stage was more carefully 
planned and organized. Between 2001 and 2003, China piloted the experimental 
curricula in selected schools in 42 experimental areas (and in more than 1,400 areas of 
29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions) before implementing them 
nationally (Ma, 2009). In 2005-06, all primary schools and secondary schools began 
to phase-in the experimental curriculum standards at grades one and seven, 
respectively. 
Moreover, the state continued to use surveys and consultation to assess and 
solicit views on the experimental curriculum, but on a larger scale and in a more 
sophisticated manner. In 2003 and 2007, the MoE (2012a) conducted nationwide 
surveys, involving some 117,000 provincial education officials, principals, teachers, 
students and parents from pilot schools, on the nature, principles and goals of China’s 
school curriculum; curriculum standards for individual subjects; and curriculum 
implementation at the school and subject levels. Between 2003 and 2010, the MoE 
organized roughly 1,000 seminars to gather feedback on revised experimental 
programmatic curriculum standards from frontline teachers across China. The 
empirical evidence gathered moved the MoE to fine-tune, rather than revamp, the 
design and implementation of the experimental curriculum standards (National Center 
for School Curriculum and Textbook Development, 2012); thus, in the late 2000s, it 
(2012a) formulated five fine-tuning principles and established subject-specific 
curriculum committees (involving 172 experts). In 2011, the MoE promulgated fine-
tuned curriculum standards for all subjects in primary and junior secondary education. 
Diversification of players in curriculum decision-making 
The third feature of China’s new curriculum making approach involves the 
diversification of the actors making and finalizing the programmatic curriculum. As 
noted by Kirst and Bird (1997) and Westbury (2008a), state-based curriculum making 
does not necessarily exclude other curriculum stakeholders at the state level; the state 
can engage them at major decision-taking points to ‘manage the political, professional, 
and public fields around schooling (Westbury, 2008a, p. 61). In addition to surveying 
students, teachers and principals, the Chinese state relied on experts and professionals 
to design and decide the school curriculum, rather than dominating the social 
distribution of knowledge. 
In 1999, at the end of the Principal Stage, the MoE established a team of 
education and psychology scholars from teacher-training universities and provincial 
education research centres and several school principals that spent, under its 
leadership, two-and-a-half years selecting content for different subjects at different 
grade levels and drafting and finalizing experimental curriculum standards (Cui, 
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2001). Unlike previous ‘teaching plans’, which focused mainly on content, these 
curriculum standards covered curriculum design, implementation and assessment, and 
shared a similar structure. For example, the experimental curriculum standard for 
mathematics specified: (a) the reasons for reforming the curriculum and social 
expectations of the new curriculum; (b) the purpose of mathematics education and 
specific goals to be achieved by students in grades 1-3, 4-6 and 7-9 in terms of 
knowledge and skills, thinking, problem solving, and feelings (qinggan) and attitudes; 
(c) teaching and learning contents to be covered at each key learning stage; and (d) 
suggestions for implementing the curriculum at key learning stages, how to teach and 
assess students, and how to design lessons and learning materials (MoE, 2001d). 
Building on Principal Stage findings, the state developed a sophisticated state-
led, expert-assisted, three-tiered mechanism to review, discuss and finalize curriculum 
standards in the Fine-tuning Stage, one which further diversified the players in the 
decision-making processes. Specifically, in early 2010, the MoE (2012a) established 
three high-level committees: the National Commission for Basic Education 
Curriculum and Textbooks (NC), the National Working Committee of Experts for 
Basic Education Curriculum and Textbooks (NWC), and the National Advisory 
Committee of Experts for Basic Education Curriculum and Textbooks (NAC). The 
NC, which made curriculum policy and oversaw the fine-tuning process, was chaired 
by the Minister of Education and included 10 senior education officials and nine 
officials from non-education ministries/departments (MoE, 2010a).  
Unlike the NC, the NAC and NWC were dominated by experts and other 
curriculum stakeholders. The overwhelming majority of the NAC’s 48 members were 
senior academics or university administrators (listed on MoE, 2010b), while the NWC, 
chaired by former Deputy Minister of Education Wang Zhan, included six to eight 
deputy chairpersons (MoE, 2010c) and more than 110 education experts, teachers and 
school subject specialists (H. Liu, 2010). Unlike the NAC, which made broad 
suggestions and proposals, the NWC was an operational taskforce, responsible for 
developing national curricula and standards for different subjects; researching and 
assessing major curriculum and textbook problems; organizing taskforces for writing 
and reviewing textbooks and vetting textbook writers; and advising local governments 
and schools on curriculum reform (MoE, 2010c). 
Numerous stakeholders were involved in the process, as the NWC organized 
more than 1,000 consultative seminars on the draft programmatic curriculum. At the 
final stage, it sent curriculum standards drafts to 32 provincial-ranked educational 
authorities, 16 university centres for basic education curriculum and 11 textbook 
publishers and editors, which generated over 20,000 comments (Wu, 2012). In an 
unprecedented move, it also engaged frontline primary and secondary school teachers, 
principals, and education experts in a series of deliberations (general, comprehensive 
and subject-specific) on the standards, and allowed them to vote on the fine-tuned 
versions (Wu, 2012). 
As a result, it took nearly 20 years for China to reform its curriculum making 
processes and mechanisms and finalize basic education curriculum standards for all 
subjects, which were gradually implemented beginning in September, 2012 (MoE, 
2011a).  
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China’s dilemma between globalization and nationalism in 
curriculum reform 
In addition to reforming its curriculum-making processes, China also revised its 
programmatic curriculum. This section compares the contents of the experimental and 
fine-tuned curriculum standards, focusing on their specification of purposes, selection 
of contents, organization of student learning, and assessment. Special attention is 
placed on how the reforms addressed educational, economic and political needs 
arising from domestic developments and increasing global competition and 
engagement. The comparison shows that both curricula were marked by struggles 
between economic and socio-political tasks, and between encouraging students to 
compete globally and developing their attachment to and love of China and the CPC. 
However, the fine-tune version differs from the experimental one in that the former 
explicitly and strongly infuses China-related elements into the school curriculum and 
emphasizes the importance of cultivating students with Chinese cultural identity in a 
global age. 
Equipping students to stay competitive and get closer to the world 
Both programmatic curricula emphasise the economic and human capital 
development aspects of education and highlight China’s efforts to enhance its global 
competitiveness through a school curriculum paradigm shift. To address global 
challenges and curriculum problems hindering human capital development, the state 
specified five interrelated intended classroom curriculum changes in the 2001 
experimental programmatic curriculum, reiterating them in its 2011 fine-tuned version. 
The first involves students’ global economic competitiveness and closeness to 
the world. Increased global interconnectedness, interdependency and competition  has 
led many nation-states, including China, to (a) increase citizens’ awareness of other 
cultures; (b) make their knowledge base broader and specializations more flexible; 
and (c) improve core competences for lifelong learning, such as getting and using 
information independently, learning to learn, critical thinking, problem-solving, 
improvisation and creativity, digital competence, and linguistic proficiency (Altbach 
& Davis, 1999; Poisson, 1998; Sani, 2000). China’s 2001 and 2011 programmatic 
curricula included new expectations of schooling and expanded the purpose and 
objectives of the school curriculum to accommodate global imperatives and education 
demands, and to enable students to ‘meet the needs of the time’, ‘progress with the 
times’, and face challenges in a fluid, knowledge-based global economy (MoE, 2001b, 
2011i); China wanted the new curriculum to address major, identified problems that 
might prevent this. 
To that end, both programmatic curricula expanded the focus of learning from 
mere content learning to include the cultivation of attitudes and feelings and the 
mastery of general skills or basic competences, including searching for and processing 
information, acquiring new knowledge, analysing and solving problems, 
communicating and cooperating with others, and language proficiency (MoE, 2001b, 
2012a). Both curricula emphasized the importance of ensuring students were 
competent in Chinese and at least one foreign language; to that end, both reform 
stages identified three foreign language subjects – English, Japanese and Russian – to 
be offered at key basic education learning stages (MoE, 2001a; 2001c). Since 2001, 
English has been taught as the primary foreign language for all students from primary 
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grade three; Japanese and Russian are offered as elective second foreign languages to 
grade seven students in select junior-secondary schools. 
The third intended curriculum change concerns China’s attempt to adopt a 
learner-centric classroom curriculum, give school education a universal orientation, 
and meet students’ developmental needs at different levels. First, in each subject 
curriculum standard, the MoE identified explicit subject-specific learning goals and 
contents for different key learning stages. Second, it adjusted the content and 
difficulty of such subjects as Chinese language and mathematics (MoE, 2011g, 
2011k). Third, daily applications and updated elements were added to bring the 
curriculum closer to students’ lives, including greater emphasis on understanding and 
interpreting situation students might encounter in daily life (MoE, 2011g), and adding 
space exploration and alternative energy topics to the general science curriculum 
(MoE, 2011b). Fourth, a new learning area, integrated practical activities, was 
introduced to give students ‘more opportunities for practice-related or inquiry learning’ 
and to integrate their learning from different subjects (Jianjun Wang, 2012, p. 63). 
Fifth and most important, both curricula attempted to establish a constructivist 
learning model in which students are active participants. Specifically, the MoE (2001e, 
2011a) strongly discouraged passive knowledge reception, memorization without 
digestion (siji yingbei), and mechanical drilling; instead, it strongly encouraged 
learning how to learn and learning through exploration. For example, the fine-tuned 
art curriculum standards encouraged students to explore the art of different ethnic 
groups and how it is reflected in local architecture, clothing and dialects, and share 
their findings with their classmates (MoE, 2011d). 
The fourth intended curriculum change concerns the role of assessment, study 
load and examination pressure. Since 2001, the MoE (2001b) has attempted to replace 
China’s longstanding culture of learning for assessment with one of assessment for 
learning and teaching, and has advocated using assessment to facilitate students’ 
development; schools, teachers, and parents should not focus only on academic results, 
but also on exploring and developing students’ potential, understanding their 
developmental needs, and establishing their self-confidence. It also encouraged using 
assessment to inform teaching and create teacher self- and co-assessment mechanisms 
in which school principals, teachers and parents could participate. Assessment for 
learning and teaching was reiterated in the 2011 curriculum standards (MoE, 2011a). 
The fifth intended curriculum change addresses the need to meet local needs 
and school conditions, in addition to global demands. The MoE (2001b) divided the 
experimental curriculum for primary and junior-secondary education into national 
components (80-85% of total class hours) and local and school-level components (15-
20%), devolving limited power to local governments and schools and changing its 
top-down mode of curriculum management. This, however, did not specifically 
require schools to re-organize to implement school-based curriculum. 
The intended changes stressed in both curricula reflect China’s awareness of 
the urgent need to readjust its school curriculum to meet changing domestic and 
global manpower needs and contexts, and its determination to prepare students for 
global challenges and to link them to their nation and the world. This could increase 
the scope and pace of students’ opening to the world, and has raised concerns about 
how to help them identify with and belong to China in a global age. 
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Reinforcing students’ socialist national identity 
Parallel to helping students remain globally competitive runs education’s 
socio-political task of cultivating a socialist Chinese citizenry. Because of its 
increasing engagement with the world, China has followed the international trend of 
promoting multiple (local, national, and global) rather than single citizenship. The 
2001 curriculum standards for citizenship education specified, for the first time, a 
socialist framework for multileveled/multidimensional citizenship education – 
involving self, family, school, local community or home town, China and the world 
(MoE, 2002a; 2002b) –  similar to other multileveled/multidimensional citizenship 
education models (e.g.,  Kubow, Grossman, & Ninomiya, 2000). Within and linking 
each level/dimension in the Chinese framework are the social contexts in which 
students’ activities take place, social activities in which they are involved, and social 
relationships in which they engage or govern their behaviors (MoE, 2002a; 2002b). 
Despite this accommodative framework, the Chinese state worries about its 
students abandoning China’s traditions and socialist identity, especially since 
socialism has lost much of its appeal, globally (Burbach, Núñez, & Kagarlitsky, 1997). 
Similar worries about the loss of national distinctiveness and identity can be identified 
in the citizenship education of other countries, including Singapore (Gopinathan, 2012) 
and South Korea (So, Kim, & Lee, 2012). Citizenship curriculum standards in China’s 
2001 and 2011 institutional and programmatic curricula commonly stress national 
dimensions of citizenship, the CPC’s political leadership and socialism. Similar to the 
1999 Decision, the 2010 Outline detailed social conceptions of education’s socio-
political task, and emphasised using moral education to make Chinese students 
‘qualified socialist citizens’ with socialist values, and to strengthen their faith in the 
CPC’s leadership and socialist system; in the late 2000s, the MoE (2012a) infused 
socialist values into the entire basic education curriculum.  
Similar to their 2001 counterparts, the 2011 citizenship education curriculum 
standards encourage grade 1-2 students to respect the national flag and emblem, learn 
the national anthem, and take pride in being Chinese (MoE, 2011f). Grade 3-6 
students are expected to know basic Chinese geography, recent domestic 
developments and policies, and China’s contributions to world civilization (MoE, 
2011e). Grade 7-9 students must understand China at a deeper level, including such 
CPC-led policies as making China moderately prosperous by 2020, features of 
China’s socialist economic and political systems, the theory of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, and the role of the CPC in China’s achievements since the 1980s 
(MoE, 2011h). To avoid or reduce ethnic conflicts, the standards recognize China as a 
multi-ethnic country and emphasise the importance of unity, equality, harmony and 
respect for cultural and ethnic differences. A new curriculum goal for junior-
secondary students emphasizes the importance of helping students, regardless of 
ethnicity, ‘identify with Chinese culture, inherit (CPC-interpreted) revolutionary 
traditions, and promote the spirit of the Chinese people’, while developing a ‘global 
consciousness and international outlook’ (MoE, 2011h, p. 5). 
Bringing Chinese culture back to foster Chinese cultural identity 
In the Fine-tuning Stage, the Chinese state realized that stressing the national 
dimension in citizenship education was not enough, as China was increasingly 
engaged in the international community. Compared to the 2001 version, the 2011 
programmatic curriculum standards were more inclusive of China’s cultural past in 
preparing students for the future, more Sino-centric, and incorporated China-specific 
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or -related elements in all subjects rather than compartmentalizing them into a single 
subject, to reinforce students’ identification with and pride in China’s cultural 
traditions and contemporary achievements. This change in the curricular status of 
Chinese culture is best understood in terms of its historical and wider contexts. 
Curriculum and culture are closely related, and can be explained in terms of changing 
attitudes towards the role of culture in nation building.  
The relationship between culture and curriculum has been a tortuous one 
throughout Chinese history. Towards the end of the Qing Dynasty and during the 
Republic of China era, Chinese culture and education were criticized as barriers to 
China’s modernization, but were still deemed important enough to be preserved in the 
school curriculum. Between the 1950s and mid-1970s, China, under Mao’s leadership, 
regarded Confucian-oriented traditional Chinese culture as feudal, and attempted to 
eradicate Confucian values during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (Brugger, 
1978). Post-Mao leaders, however, recognizing the importance of Chinese culture to 
state governance, have begun to use traditional Chinese values (e.g., social harmony, 
honour, shame) rather than socialism to address domestic problems and issues (e.g., 
social unrest, money worship, hyper-individuality) arising since the 1980s (Law, 
2011). 
In the 2000s, the state realized culture’s important role in domestic 
modernization and development and its potential for international soft power 
influence. Some two months before promulgating the 2011 curriculum standards, the 
Communist Party of China Central Committee (2011) released its new national 
cultural policy, which stressed the importance of Chinese culture and made Chinese 
cultural prosperity a national priority. Domestically, China uses culture to promote 
ethnic solidarity, increase national competitiveness, support economic and social 
development, and cultivate citizens’ spiritual life (Law, 2011). Internationally, China 
promotes Chinese language, history and culture to resist the cultural aggression of 
other countries, increase its international cultural influence, and showcase China’s 
openness and achievements to the world. From 2004-2011, China established 358 
Confucius Institutes (similar to the UK’s British Council) in overseas higher 
education institutes, and Confucius teaching sites in 500 primary and secondary 
schools in 105 countries, servicing 500,000 registered students (MoE, 2013b). 
The 2011 programmatic curriculum brought Chinese culture to the fore. First, 
to afford students more exposure to Chinese cultural traditions, the Chinese language 
curriculum requires grade 1-9 students to take calligraphy lessons (in addition to 
learning how to write Chinese characters with an ordinary pen) (MoE, 2011k), while 
music curriculum standards require students to learn and sing more Chinese 
traditional music and ethnic music (such as Beijing opera) (MoE, 2011j). In 
mathematics, grade 1-3 students need to learn the historical importance of the abacus 
in ancient China, and how to show a three-digit figure on it (MoE, 2011g).  
Second, the new standards emphasize China’s advancement and achievements 
under the CPC’s leadership with a view to increasing students’ pride and faith in their 
political leadership. For example, the general science curriculum teaches junior-
secondary students about China’s achievements in astronomy, aerospace technology 
and industry (MoE, 2011b), while the history curriculum standard addresses China’s 
achievements since the 16th CPC National Congress in 2002, to helping students 
‘persistently uphold’ the CPC’s leadership and ‘firmly believe’ in Chinese socialism 
(MoE, 2011c, p. 22).  
All this suggests that, while encouraging its students to master the knowledge 
and skills needed to face global challenges, China under the CPC fears they may lose 
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a national identity that includes ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, and 
continues to imbue the programmatic curriculum with prescribed socialist values. It 
has also added elements relating to past and contemporary Chinese achievements to 
curriculum standards for both citizenship and non-citizenship-education subjects to 
help foster students’ sense of belonging to and pride in China and, more important, 
their faith in the CPC’s leadership. As in the past, the Chinese school curriculum, with 
its emphasis on development and socio-political socialization, perpetuates the tension 
between ‘red’ and ‘expert’ for reviving China and making a modern Chinese citizenry. 
Challenges to translating programmatic curriculum into 
classroom curriculum 
The translation from institutional and programmatic curricula into actual classroom 
curriculum can be difficult because the latter is often shaped by teachers’ curriculum 
perspectives and factors shaping classroom context and events (Doyle, 1992b). Both 
the 2001 and 2011 programmatic curricula reveal China’s willingness to change 
longstanding curricular perceptions and practices for enhancing the quality of its 
human capital by broadening the scope of learning to include competences, shifting 
from teacher-centric to learner-centric pedagogy, and from learning for assessment to 
assessment for teaching and learning. While these proposed curriculum changes in 
China are expected to be realized at the school and classroom levels (Halpin, 2010), 
they are constrained by both curricular and extra-curricular factors.  
Firstly, of the five intended curriculum changes, the attempted shift to learner-
centric and constructivist learning has received the most severe criticism. At the 
systemic level, Xing (2011, p. 5), a physicist, severely criticized the approach as 
‘absurd’, as the major pedagogy behind constructivism and scientific exploration has 
not yet been proved successful; Xing cited Taiwan’s unsuccessful foray into 
constructivism, which was finally abandoned in the early 2000s. At the school level, 
since the 2001 implementation of the experimental curriculum, the intended 
pedagogical changes have not materialized, and schools have been criticized for 
failing to help the state realize them (Walker, Qian, & Zhang, 2011). At the classroom 
level, pedagogical changes in many schools are, from a teacher’s perspective, 
‘ritualistic’ –  for example, replacing lectures with low-level questions and answers to 
give the appearance of enquiry (Cheng, 2004). These criticisms may be too harsh, 
however, as testing the proposed pedagogies and changing the classroom culture and 
teachers’ mentality and practices could take a long time. 
Secondly, the ability of curriculum reform to reduce students’ heavy study and 
examination load by promoting assessment for teaching and learning (rather than vice 
versa) has been questioned. This study pressure manifests itself in long school hours; 
students learning more (and more difficult) content than the curriculum requires; 
different forms of drilling, including supplementary lessons organized after school 
and on non-school days, and additional exercises and mock examination papers (Gu 
& Shi, 2010). The CPC Central Committee and State Council (2010) identified 
reducing this study load as an important task for China’s education reform and 
development between 2010 and 2020, and expected the 2011 fine-tuned curriculum 
for basic education to hasten this goal.  
Despite its good intentions, the 2011 curriculum might not be able to do so, as 
shifting the classroom curriculum paradigm involves several intertwined, extra-
curricular barriers. The first relates to structural problems in China education system. 
Despite the expansion of senior-secondary education in the early 1990s and higher 
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education in 1999, competition for post-compulsory education spots remains very 
keen. In 2011, 84% of age cohorts were admitted to senior-secondary education 
(grade 10), while only 26.9% went on to degree and sub-degree programmes in higher 
education (MoE, 2012c). Public academic examination scores remain a major 
determinant of access to further education; getting a place in famous senior secondary 
schools and universities normally requires higher scores and is therefore more 
competitive. In addition, China’s one-child policy feeds parents’ sociocultural fear of 
having their child fall behind, and their desire to have their child be a ‘dragon’ or 
‘phoenix’ and enjoy a better future (Q. Huang, 2012). 
An additional barrier involves widespread, symbiotic webs of interest among 
different education stakeholders. The first involves money-making; despite being 
forbidden to do so by the State Council (2011), it is not uncommon for government 
units, schools and publishers to profit from parents’ fear of having their child lag 
behind, by requiring students to buy supplementary learning materials or drilling 
exercises, or attend fee-for-service tutorial lessons outside school hours. Another web 
of interests is more subtle. In many areas in China, students’ academic performance is 
linked to their assessment by teachers, their teachers’ assessment by their schools, 
schools’ by educational authorities, and educational authorities’ by local governments 
(Law, 2006). Many parents and students use public examination and competition 
results as major criteria for assessing and choosing schools, thus affecting schools’ 
reputation, status, student intake and funding (particularly from non-government 
sources, such as sponsorship fees from parents). As such, schools compete for better 
students, force teachers to give more drills and examinations, and promote their 
students’ performance and promotion rates to parents to attract new students. 
Similarly, local educational authorities use students’ academic performance to assess 
school performance, while local governments use school performance to assess those 
same local educational authorities, thus creating a vicious cycle of assessment, with 
students’ needs largely disregarded. 
In March, 2013, the MoE (2013a) started a Long March Campaign for 
Reducing Study Load (jianfu wanlihang) in primary and junior secondary schools 
across China. The MoE (2012b) also moved to hold principals and deputy principals 
accountable by incorporating five major items into their professional standards: not 
freely raising the difficulty of the curriculum; reducing students’ study time; 
discouraging the over-pursuit of academic performance; stopping teachers from 
offering fee-charging tutorial lessons; and forbidding the promotion of commercial 
goods and services to students. 
Whether China’s new efforts will rectify the above-mentioned irregularities 
remains to be seen. Since the founding of socialist China in 1949, both national and 
local governments have attempted, in vain, to use administrative regulations and 
measures to reduce students’ heavy study load (Zhang & Fan, 2009); thus, there is no 
compelling reason to believe that these recent initiatives will fare any better. The 
impact of limited access to higher education, the vicious cycles of assessment and the 
sociocultural psychology of not falling behind are strongly entrenched across China 
and remain strong impediments to the realization of a paradigm shift in Chinese 
classroom curriculum. 
Discussion and conclusion 
To help explain how China copes with 21st century manpower challenges, this article 
has examined the dynamics, complexity and constraints of China’s curriculum reform 
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over the past 20 years. It has demonstrated that, in China, curriculum reform was used 
by the state as an important human development strategy to meet the state’s emerging 
manpower needs by resetting the aims of schooling and socially (re)distributing and 
(re)prioritizing knowledge through content selection. The process was propelled by 
China’s need to sustain its growth and remain competitive in a global age, its 
longstanding historical aspirations for modernization and a return to global 
prominence (stemming from its military defeats at the hands of foreign powers in the 
19th century), as well as its need to cope with educational issues arising from change 
in school clientele since the late 1980s due to enrolment expansion.  
As such, the Chinese government played an important role in generating and 
recontextualizing pedagogical discourse. Specifically, the state was a major mediator 
between the nation and the world, and between curriculum and society. It highlighted, 
in the institutional curriculum, the nation’s aspirations for modernization, as well as 
broad societal goals and conceptions of general pedagogies in response to domestic 
and global socio-economic changes, including those stemming from globalization. It 
was a principal selector, choosing and prioritising the knowledge, skills and 
competences to be included in the programmatic curriculum standards, and served as 
a gatekeeper and reinforcer of socialist values, Chinese culture and national identity 
among students in China’s pursuit of global ascendance. The Chinese curriculum 
reform, however, may not come to fruition as hoped for at the classroom level, 
because the major problems it addresses (such as learner-centric pedagogy and 
students’ heavy study load) cannot be solved by reselecting and reprioritizing 
curriculum components alone. The realization of the new curriculum is challenged by 
both curricular and extra-curricular factors.  
This article contributes to the literature on curriculum making and to specific 
studies on Chinese curriculum and social change. Although there is a body of 
curriculum research focusing on assessment and standards-based curriculum reform, 
this article has demonstrated that curriculum (re)making remains an important 
educational concern in countries like China. China’s curriculum reform shares some 
of the features of state-based curriculum making frameworks, including: the vital role 
of the state in shaping the institutional curriculum as a social perception of schooling 
and society, and in deciding what is to be included in the programmatic curriculum 
standards (Westbury, 2008a); the regulation of the social distribution of knowledge, 
as well as of social power and control during the generation and recontextualization of 
the pedagogical discourse (Neves & Morais, 2001); and, the involvement of different 
actors to co-shape the curriculum and participate in its making at various levels (Kirst 
& Bird, 1997; Westbury, 2008a) so as to balance diverse interests and ensure that the 
reform is, at least, less effectively challenged (Haft & Hopmann, 1990). 
Despite these similarities, China’s case demonstrates four interesting, 
distinctive features. First, China’s case shows that the state can employ curriculum 
reform as an essential strategy for enhancing the quality of its human capital and its 
international competitiveness by reselecting and reprioritizing in programmatic 
curriculum standards what to be learned and mastered at which learning stage. Second, 
it demonstrates that the state can use a two-stage approach to curriculum making to 
legitimise and moderate planned changes. In the case of China, this approach 
consisted of a Principal Stage in which the course and contents of major institutional 
and programmatic curricula were set, followed by a 10-year long Fine-tuning Stage 
that saw the piloting of and collection of evidence from the experimental curriculum 
standards for different subjects at the classroom level across the country, the soliciting 
of feedback from political and professional fields and, in particular, frontline teachers 
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and principals, and the making of appropriate curriculum amendments. Third, the case 
of China shows that while pigeonholing subject-related knowledge, skills and 
dispositions into different subjects, the state transcends subject boundaries and holds 
all subjects responsible both for promoting the skills and attitudes that bring students 
closer to the world, and also for reinforcing in them a socialist national identity and 
sense of pride in China’s historical and contemporary achievements. 
Fourth, China’s case shows that dominant state governments, like China’s, can 
learn how to engage stakeholders, and to facilitate their engagement with and 
participation in different stages of curriculum making. In the Principal Stage, as 
shown above, the Chinese state learned to engage other stakeholders, such as students, 
teachers, principals and experts, in drafting experimental curriculum standards. In the 
Fine-tuning Stage, the scale and scope of that engagement was greatly increased and 
made more systematic, as the state fine-tuned the curriculum standards. The Chinese 
state’s efforts reflect the new dynamics of its interactions with various players, its 
acceptance of consultation and evidence to inform its decision making, and its 
willingness to build consensus and solicit popular support in pubic processes to tame 
planned changes and translate the institutional curriculum into programmatic curricula 
for different subjects, and thence to the classroom. 
Moreover, this article advances extant studies on Chinese curriculum and 
social change in two major ways. First, the article supplements the literature on 
Chinese curriculum and globalization, which has focused mainly on the economic 
function of curriculum (e.g., Dello-Iacovo, 2009; Jianjun Wang, 2012), by expanding 
its scope of analysis to include the socio-political function of curriculum, so as to 
provide a better interpretation and explanation of the Chinese curriculum and its 
reform. The article has shown that curriculum’s economic and socio-political 
functions were equally important factors in Chinese curriculum reform in the 2000s. 
The 2001 and 2011 institutional and programmatic curricula reveal China’s struggle 
between opening itself to the world and promoting nationalism in a global age. On the 
one hand, China significantly revamped its programmatic curriculum and sought to 
change what is taught and learned in classrooms, and how, to equip Chinese students 
with the necessary knowledge, skills, competences and attitudes to face the challenges 
of the 21st century. On the other hand, it continued to emphasize the transmission of 
socialist values to students in the Principal and Fine-tuning Stages of the curriculum 
reform, and stressed the promotion of Chinese civilization and culture in the Fine-
tuning Stage.  
The latter suggests an interesting relationship between national building, 
culture and curriculum. Lawton (1975) saw curriculum as a selection from the culture 
of a given society and an important vehicle for cultural transmission to future 
generations. People’s views of culture, as Thaman (1993) argued, can affect their 
attitudes towards education and curriculum. In China, giving Chinese culture such a 
high profile in the new curriculum required the CPC-led state to reposition the role of 
Chinese culture in China’s modernization and rejuvenation. To some extent, the 
official reinstatement of Chinese culture in the 2011 school curriculum represents a 
retreat from the state’s earlier denunciation of traditional Chinese culture as a barrier 
to development, and signifies culture’s importance to China’s nation building and 
revival.  
The new Chinese school curriculum is tasked with being an important medium 
for cultural and heritage preservation. The trajectory of China’s tension between 
development and national identity since the 19th century, as presented earlier, suggests 
that the more China opens to and engages in the world in the 21st century, the more 
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open and responsive the curriculum will be to foreign concepts and practices, and to 
encouraging Chinese students to remain globally competitive and closer to the world. 
The more integrated China becomes with the world, the more urgent its need to 
reinforce its students’ Chinese identity, particularly their knowledge about and sense 
of identification with Chinese culture and their pride in and sense of belonging to a 
CPC-led China. 
Second, the article advances studies on Chinese curriculum reform, which 
mainly attribute China’s failure to apply imported foreign educational concepts in its 
reforms to Chinese cultural traditions (e.g., F. Q. Huang, 2004) or examination 
pressure (e.g., Cui & Wang, 2006; Dello-Iacovo, 2009), by offering a more complex 
explanation. It has demonstrated that China’s curriculum reform is likely limited by 
three inter-related, extra-curricular constraints. First, it is impossible to separate 
curriculum reform from other economic, political, social, and cultural forces, or for it 
to be a panacea for the myriad longstanding and deep-seated problems confronting 
China’s education. Second, curriculum changes seldom succeed without favourable 
extra-curricular conditions, such as broadening students’ access to higher education 
and narrowing the gap between good and weak schools. Third, societal culture can be 
a strong barrier to curriculum reform. Although experimental curriculum standards 
have been implemented for more than 10 years, the intended curriculum changes have 
been hindered by students’ heavy study load and examination pressure, vicious cycles 
of assessment in judging performance, and the domino effects of a deep-seated 
sociocultural psychology on the part of parents, students, teachers, schools, and local 
governments. 
To conclude, Chinese curriculum reform, as a key human capital development 
strategy since the early 1990s, has been driven by new economic, socio-political and 
educational needs resulting from globalization. China sought to use curriculum reform 
to realize its century-old dream of national revival, enhance its competitiveness in the 
face of intense global competition, and maintain its national cultural distinctiveness 
and socialist identity under the CPC’s leadership. The state serves as an important 
actor, charting the course of pedagogical discourse and regulating the social 
distribution of what is taught and learnt in school by mediating curriculum reform 
between society and schooling, and between China and the world. It remains to be 
seen whether the 2011 fine-tuned curriculum will help China balance globalization 
and nationalism, and whether it will bring about the intended curriculum changes 
needed to enhance the quality of China’s manpower and sustain its growth and rise in 
the 21st century. Similar to its 2001 experimental counterpart, the fine-tuned 
curriculum is expected to confront both curricular and extra-curricular factors that 
curriculum reform alone cannot address. 
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